Re Protocol reUSD
Score Breakdown
| Category | Weight | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Audits & Historical | 20% | 2.50 |
| Centralization & Control | 30% | 4.00 |
| Funds Management | 30% | 4.00 |
| Liquidity Risk | 15% | 3.50 |
| Operational Risk | 5% | 2.50 |
| Final Score | 3.6 / 5.0 | |
Overview
Re Protocol is a decentralized onchain reinsurance marketplace that tokenizes real-world reinsurance treaties, enabling DeFi participants to earn insurance-backed yields. The protocol is designed as a blockchain-native version of Lloyd's of London, connecting onchain capital with regulated reinsurance programs.
reUSD is the protocol's principal-protected, yield-accruing deposit token (branded "Basis-Plus"). It is designed as the "stable core" of the Re Protocol, analogous to a tokenized money-market fund with blockchain composability.
Yield Mechanism: reUSD accrues yield daily. The base rate is a single blended rate — a weighted average of (i) deployed capital earning the risk-free rate (SOFR) and (ii) undeployed capital capturing the Ethena USDe hedged basis trade — plus one 250 bps spread applied to the blend (per docs.re.xyz and confirmed by the NAV formula in Funds Management → Token Mechanism). This is not a "higher-of" floor between two independently-spread paths; the 250 bps spread is added once to the weighted blend, not to each path.
The resulting "Applicable APY" is converted to a daily rate, and reUSD's token price (not quantity) increases daily. Current APY is approximately 6-9+%. See Funds Management → Token Mechanism for how the price is written onchain.
Capital Deployment:
- Users deposit admitted assets (e.g., USDC) into the Insurance Capital Layer (ICL) smart contracts and receive reUSD
- A portion of the pool is converted into cash/T-Bills held in a §114 Reinsurance Trust Account, providing regulatory collateral to a Cayman-domiciled partner reinsurer (licensed by CIMA under Class B(iii))
- The offchain entity issues Surplus Notes to the ICL, contractually locking in principal protection and an interest rate matching the Applicable APY
- Offchain balances are attested by The Network Firm (with read-only account access) and — confirmed June 17, 2026 — published onchain through a live Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve feed on Avalanche ("Re Offchain Reserves," proxy
0xc79a363a3f849d8b3F6A1932f748eA9d4fB2f607, data.chain.link). This corrects the earlier finding that no Chainlink PoR feed existed. Important caveats: the feed is on Avalanche only and is not consumed by reUSD's Ethereum contracts (it does not feed reUSD pricing or redemption logic); its data source is The Network Firm's LedgerLens™ PoR API (i.e. the same offchain attestor, now Chainlink-signed, not an independent second source); Chainlink's own listing labels it "non-value-securing" with a disclaimer that neither TNF nor Chainlink attests to the accuracy of the balance data; and it reports "Re Offchain Reserves" generically (~$176.8M on June 17, 2026), not a reUSD-only figure. The reUSD share price itself is still written directly viasetSharePriceon the Share Price Calculator (not via this PoR feed); the onchain sUSDe price uses the Chainlink sUSDe/USD feed0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099. See the Chainlink usage appendix.
Key metrics (market data refreshed June 17, 2026; the detailed onchain reserve / DEX / redemption snapshots later in this report remain as of the Apr 17, 2026 audit):
- reUSD Price: ~$1.084 (CoinGecko); verified onchain as
1.0839via Share Price CalculatorgetSharePrice()(up from ~$1.072 on Apr 17) - reUSD Market Cap: ~$172.2M (all chains, CoinGecko) — down from ~$186.7M on Apr 17 (supply fell faster than the price rose)
- reUSD Total Supply: ~159.0M tokens (CoinGecko, all chains); ~157.5M on Ethereum (Etherscan) — down from ~174.1M / ~172.6M on Apr 17 (net redemptions + LayerZero cross-chain migration)
- 24h Trading Volume: ~$1.2M (CoinGecko) — down from ~$7.3M on Apr 17
- TVL (DeFi Llama, protocol-wide): ~$262.1M (DeFi Llama) — up from ~$198.1M on Apr 17 (peaked ~$288M in late May). Note this is the whole Re protocol (reUSD + reUSDe + other) and now exceeds reUSD's own ~$172.2M market cap by ~$90M, reflecting reUSDe / other-product growth rather than reUSD growth
- Total Deposits (Transparency Dashboard): ~$196.8M (Apr 17, 2026; not re-verified June 17)
Links:
Risk Summary
Key Strengths
- Senior tranche position (structural): reUSD sits senior to reUSDe (mezzanine) and Re Capital (first-loss reinsurer equity) in the loss waterfall; both subordinated layers (105–110% Re Capital, 110–115% reUSDe) must be breached before reUSD is impaired at >115% combined ratio.
- Third-party offchain reserve verification + live Chainlink PoR: The Network Firm attests offchain bank balances (Oct 2025 AUP is the verified document), and as of June 2026 those attestations are also published onchain through a live Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve feed on Avalanche ("Re Offchain Reserves," ~$176.8M). The PoR feed is a genuine transparency improvement, though it transports TNF's attestation rather than adding an independent verifier and is not consumed by reUSD's Ethereum logic.
- Comprehensive smart-contract audit coverage: 4 public smart-contract audit reports across Hacken and Certora, including Certora formal verification and a Hacken audit of the Chainlink-Functions-based
NAVConsumerthat is deployed onchain as the standard price writer. The Network Firm AUP is due diligence/reserve verification, not a smart-contract audit. - Onchain NAV path with automation and deviation guard: Daily share price is written by a Chainlink-Functions + Chainlink-Automation consumer with a
maxDeviationBps = 1000(10%) onchain check. Caveat: a single EOA can bypass it — see Key Risks. - Timelock on upgrades:
TimelockController.getMinDelay() = 172800(48 hours) on all privileged governance actions routed through it.DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLEon reUSD and ICL sits with a 3-of-5 Safe multisig. - Emergency mechanisms: Pause functionality on the InstantRedemption, LayerZero adapter, and NAV Consumer; designated recovery wallets; Chainalysis runtime monitoring.
Key Risks
- Single EOA can bypass the NAV Oracle: the standard price path is the audited Chainlink-Functions
NAVConsumer(10% deviation cap). However, the same EOA holds bothPRICE_SETTER_ROLEonSharePriceCalculatorand all admin / emergency / keeper roles onNAVConsumer. It can (a) write directly toSharePriceCalculator, skipping the Functions path, (b) callsetDeviationCheckEnabled(false)to disable the guard, or (c)forceNAVUpdateonce per 4 hours. Compromise of this key ≈ unchecked power over the reUSD share price. - Significant offchain capital deployment: Majority of assets are deployed offchain into §114 Trust and reinsurance programs. This introduces counterparty risk with the trust bank, partner reinsurer, and custodians that cannot be verified fully onchain.
- Instant redemption vault holds no USDC: The Daily Instant Redemption Vault holds
0USDC +6.188MsUSDe. The Redemption Reserves Custodian (EOA) holds0USDC +53.263MsUSDe.dayPayoutTokenis sUSDe — USDC-denominated instant exits are unavailable under the current config. - Onchain reserves heavily concentrated in sUSDe: reUSD-only onchain reserves total ~$97.37M (~52.6% of Ethereum NAV — the protocol-stated ≥50% target is met with only ~2.6 pp of headroom, after excluding the reUSDe custodian that earlier drafts had folded in). ~88% of the reserve is sUSDe and only ~9.6% (~$9.34M) is USDC. Ethena (sUSDe issuer) is a material counterparty: an Ethena incident, sUSDe unstaking bottleneck, or USDe depeg would directly impair the "50%+ onchain backing" narrative even before reaching offchain exposures. The BUIDL / T-bill wrappers mentioned in Re's materials are not held onchain.
- Three MINTER_ROLE holders on reUSD: Beyond the ICL,
InstantRedemptionandShareTokenMinterBurneralso hold MINTER_ROLE. The ICL path enforces backing viasafeTransferFrom.InstantRedemptionuses the role for burns during redemption.ShareTokenMinterBurneris a LayerZero OFT wrapper — its mint path has no backing check by design (supply is conserved cross-chain), but the OFT adapter0x2BB4046022B9161f3F84Ad8E35cac1d5946e0e85and the wrapper are both owned by the same EOA0x6C15B25E9750Dccb698C1a4023f34015bFe57649(not a multisig). Compromise of that key would let an attacker repoint the adapter and mint up to2,500,000 reUSD / 24h / peer(onchain rate limit) on Ethereum without backing. - DEX liquidity thin: only ~$14.96M of onchain-verified Re reUSD liquidity on DEXes (~8.0% of ~$186.7M market cap). (Previously-cited "~$26.2M" figure included Resupply reUSD pools, a different token.)
- KYC gating: All deposits and redemptions require KYC. This limits the universe of users who can exit and creates regulatory/jurisdictional risk.
- Quarterly redemption queue: Once instant buffer is exhausted, redemptions are windowed and pro-rata. Capital release from reinsurance programs is reevaluated quarterly per Re's public materials.
- Reinsurance tail risk: Underlying assets are exposed to insurance claim risk. reUSD is impaired once the portfolio combined ratio exceeds 115% (its attachment point), after Re Capital (~$73M, first-loss, 105–110%) and all reUSDe reserves (mezzanine, 110–115%) are depleted. Per Re's model, reUSD's modeled loss likelihood is ~0.9% (probability of reaching 115%) — not the ~0.03% at 135% that earlier drafts emphasized (135% is a deep-stress point above the attachment, not the attachment itself). Re's historical combined ratio is ~92% and the portfolio avoids catastrophe lines, but the corrected attachment makes reUSD's tail meaningfully less remote than previously framed (all figures Re-asserted, model undisclosed).
- No bug bounty program found: No Immunefi or comparable bug bounty program identified.
Critical Risks
- Custody / asset-movement surface — ~92% of onchain reserves at plain EOAs:
$89.77Mof$97.37Mof onchain reUSD reserves sits at two plain EOAs listed in the AUP-Report-2025:0x295F67…689EICL Custodial Wallet ($24.39M) and0x9eA38e…ADF8Redemption Reserves Custodian ($65.38M). (A third same-pattern EOA,0xd437…31e9, holds ~$2.56M of reUSDe collateral — same custody risk, different token.) None has code; all look identical to single-key wallets from the chain's perspective. No onchain delay, destination whitelist, or role check applies to their outbound transfers — one ECDSA signature moves the funds. The claimed Fireblocks MPC custody (N-of-M offchain quorum, destination policies) is unverifiable by anyone outside Re; TNF's AUP procedure was "observe Re Management access the Fireblocks MPC wallet," which does not cryptographically attest the N-of-M quorum. The 48h Timelock does NOT gate these flows. See Funds Management → Collateralization for the full custody table. - Offchain dependency concentration: The protocol's value proposition depends on offchain entities (Cayman reinsurer, §114 Trust, The Network Firm, Fireblocks) operating honestly and solvent. Onchain verification cannot fully cover offchain risks.
- Oracle/setter manipulation: the standard share-price path is the audited Chainlink-Functions
NAVConsumer(10% deviation cap), but a compromised admin EOA can bypass it (write directly toSharePriceCalculator, disable the deviation check, or callforceNAVUpdateevery 4h) and write arbitrary prices. A Chainlink PoR feed for "Re Offchain Reserves" now exists on Avalanche, but it transports TNF's offchain attestation rather than independently verifying reserves and is not consumed by reUSD's pricing path (see the Chainlink usage appendix) — so reserve assurance still reduces to The Network Firm's attestation (now Chainlink-published) plus the onchain balances we audit directly. - Liquidity mismatch: reUSD represents liquid onchain tokens partially backed by offchain reinsurance capital. Capital release is reevaluated quarterly, and programs are short-duration and cat-light (per performance memo). The instant redemption vault holds no USDC (sUSDe only —
6.188Min vault,53.263Min Redemption Reserves Custodian). In a bank-run scenario, sUSDe redemption liquidity plus only ~$14.96M in DEX liquidity would need to absorb exits for the full outstanding supply (~$186.7M at the Apr 17 snapshot; ~$172.2M market cap as of June 17); windowed queue handles the remainder.
Full Report
Contract Addresses
Ethereum Network
Protocol Controls (Ethereum)
MPC team descriptions below come from Re's public protocol materials and cannot be independently verified onchain (MPC signer sets are offchain). What IS onchain-verifiable: (a) the Governance Safe is a 3-of-5 Safe multisig (not MPC) at 0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd holding DEFAULT_ADMIN on reUSD/ICL and PROPOSER/CANCELLER on the Timelock; (b) the Timelock min delay is 172800 seconds = 48 hours; (c) an OpenZeppelin v5 AccessManager contract at 0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8 is the authority() for the Instant Redemption contract and is administered by the Access Admin EOA below.
| Role | Controller Address | Control Mechanism (per docs) | Onchain Authority | Permissions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oracle Admin | 0x49BC5A880f77247A348764DdB95951cd9212A0ee |
MPC 3-of-5 (docs), no timelock | EOA; role on Share Price Calculator not verified — current PRICE_SETTER_ROLE holders onchain: 0x6c15b25e...bfe57649 and 0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6 |
Configure price feeds (per docs) |
| Redemptions Admin | 0xEE16bE0374f2eFb34218affC1a8EbEe9310c47f8 |
MPC 3-of-5 (docs), 48 hours | EOA | Set redemption limits, top-up redemption vault (per docs) |
| Access Admin | 0x80a62B72dF1136aCBc57141FB67Aa46812fECAFc |
MPC 5-of-8 (docs), 48 hours | EOA; observed calling grantRole / labelRole on AccessManager 0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8 |
Admin of OZ AccessManager (roles for Instant Redemption, etc.) |
| Custodian Manager | 0x9b6d7f2de2E4569297C7e88531E47679cEbE6eC9 |
MPC 3-of-5 (docs), 48 hours | EOA; holds CUSTODIAN_MANAGER_ROLE (0x0792b378…) on ICL — verified |
Add/remove collateral custodians |
| Governance (Upgrades / DEFAULT_ADMIN) | 0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd |
Safe 3-of-5 (onchain-verified; not MPC) | Holds DEFAULT_ADMIN + UPGRADER on reUSD and ICL, PROPOSER + CANCELLER on Timelock | Contract upgrades, role administration (routed through Timelock for timelocked actions) |
| Timelock executor | 0x4BFea59b948a1a0FAC3C8C40BfD86E0e740738F3 |
EOA (onchain-verified) | Holds EXECUTOR_ROLE on the Timelock | Execute queued timelock transactions after 48h delay |
Cross-Chain Deployments
| Chain | reUSD Address |
|---|---|
| Avalanche | 0x180aF87b47Bf272B2df59dccf2D76a6eaFa625Bf |
| Arbitrum | 0x76cE01F0Ef25AA66cC5F1E546a005e4A63B25609 |
| Base | 0x7D214438D0F27AfCcC23B3d1e1a53906aCE5CFEa |
| Katana | 0xe08853433fDBC504240455e295B644E0F44c3B29 |
| BNB Chain | 0xbA9425EC55ee0E72216D18e0ad8BBbA2553bFb60 |
| Ink | 0x5BCf6B008bf80b9296238546BaCE1797657B05d6 |
Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures
Re Protocol has 4 public smart-contract audit reports from Hacken and Certora, plus a 2025 Agreed-Upon Procedures (AUP) report from The Network Firm for offchain reserve/custody verification.
Audit / Due Diligence History
| # | Date | Scope | Firm | Key Findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sep 2024 | Smart Contract Audit (DeFi) | Hacken | 29 findings (0 Critical, 0 High, 4 Medium, 7 Low, 18 Observations), all resolved. Centralized minting, unaudited libraries, gas risk, 42.11% branch coverage | Hacken |
| 2 | Dec 2024 | Smart Contract Audit | Hacken | Follow-up audit, issues remediated | Hacken |
| 3 | Apr 2025 | NAV Oracle Audit | Hacken | Scope: the Chainlink-Functions-based NAVConsumer + related code at github.com/resilience-foundation/nav-oracle (commits ee7e98… / e3dd86ef…). 8 findings, all resolved. The audited contract IS deployed and active onchain at 0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6, holds PRICE_SETTER_ROLE on the SharePriceCalculator, and runs daily at 23:45 UTC. |
Hacken |
| 4 | Sep 2025 | Re Core (comprehensive) | Certora | 13 issues identified, all addressed and fixed. Formal verification and manual review. | Certora |
| 5 | Oct 2025 | Agreed-Upon Procedures (reserve/custody verification; not a smart-contract audit) | The Network Firm | Independent verification of offchain operational controls and reserve attestation | AUP Report |
Hacken Aug 2024 Findings (Detail)
- Centralization: USDRWA and ReToken contracts concentrate minting/burning in a single address
- Unaudited Dependencies: Protocol uses libraries/contracts without security audits
- Gas Risk: Iteration over large dynamic arrays risks denial of service from out-of-gas errors
- Missing Governance Audit: Governance code was not covered in the audit scope
- Low Test Coverage: 42.11% branch coverage -- deployment and basic interactions tested, multi-user interactions not thoroughly tested
Bug Bounty
- No Immunefi bug bounty program found for Re Protocol
- No Safe Harbor adoption found via SEAL Safe Harbor Registry
Known Issues
- Centralized oracle price updates for reUSD (daily, admin-controlled)
- Centralized minting/burning via single controller addresses
- Governance code not yet audited
Historical Track Record
- Production History: Re Protocol launched in late 2022. reUSD token inception June 12, 2025 (per RWA.xyz). Curve pool created ~9 months ago per GeckoTerminal.
- TVL & supply (June 17, 2026): DeFiLlama protocol-wide TVL ~$262.1M (up from ~$198.1M on Apr 17; whole-protocol figure that now exceeds reUSD's own market cap). reUSD market cap ~$172.2M across all chains (CoinGecko, down from ~$186.7M). reUSD total supply ~159.0M (CoinGecko); ~157.5M on Ethereum (onchain
totalSupply()), down from ~172.6M — net redemptions + LayerZero cross-chain migration. reUSD itself contracted while the broader protocol grew — a divergence worth watching. - Written Premiums (Re-reported): ~$409M premiums written inception-to-date (of which ~$226M written in 2026), per Re's Capital Strategy dashboard and a May 26, 2026 press release. This is a cumulative premium written figure, not earned premium and not reUSD TVL; earlier drafts cited a smaller ~$168.8M / ~$178M (now superseded). Not independently verified.
- Exchange Rate History: reUSD has appreciated from ~$1.00 to ~$1.084 (onchain
getSharePrice, June 17, 2026), representing ~8.4% cumulative yield since inception (June 2025); the price is monotonically increasing as designed. - Incidents: No reported security incidents, exploits, or hacks found for Re Protocol's reUSD on Rekt News or DeFi Llama hacks database. Note: Resupply Protocol (a different project with a different reUSD token at a different address) suffered a $9.6M exploit in June 2025 -- this is unrelated to Re Protocol/re.xyz.
- Peg/Price Stability: reUSD is not a stablecoin in the traditional sense. Its price is designed to monotonically increase (accruing yield), so "depegging" is not applicable in the same way. The token price should only ever go up.
Funds Management
Token Mechanism
reUSD is an ERC-20 deposit token that uses a price-appreciation model (not rebasing):
- Users deposit admitted assets (USDC) into the ICL smart contract and receive reUSD; the token price increases daily based on the Applicable APY.
- Onchain price path (verified Apr 17, 2026): the share price is stored in
SharePriceCalculator0xd1D104a7515989ac82F1AFDa15a23650411b05B8and written viasetSharePrice(uint256). The standard writer isNAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6— a Chainlink Functions + Chainlink Automation consumer (DONfun-ethereum-mainnet-1, subscription85, daily at 23:45 UTC).NAVConsumerenforces a 10% onchain deviation cap (maxDeviationBps = 1000) and was audited by Hacken in April 2025 (github.com/resilience-foundation/nav-oracle, 8 findings, all resolved). ThePriceRouter0xFe76cF5eD606593fB7764f33627B8D7E0f9Fab66reads the calculator viaSharePriceOracle0x0764BFa862164D28799F31e7e1e7206F5177B6bB; the same router reads sUSDe viaSimpleOracle0xb6aD3633cB3FAfed3D375d8c64240f122E19fB4Dwrapping Chainlink'ssUSDe/USDaggregator0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099. TheSharePriceCalculatoritself only enforcesnewPrice != 0— the deviation cap lives in theNAVConsumer, not the calculator. - Residual concern: both
PRICE_SETTER_ROLEonSharePriceCalculatorand all admin/updater roles onNAVConsumer(includingEMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLEwhich can callforceNAVUpdate, and the ability to flipsetDeviationCheckEnabled(false)to disable the guardrail) sit with the same EOA0x6C15B25E9750Dccb698C1a4023f34015bFe57649. That EOA can bypassNAVConsumerentirely and write any positive price directly to the calculator. - The Network Firm performs offchain attestations of the §114 Trust balances (publication cadence not independently established). A Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve feed for "Re Offchain Reserves" is live on Avalanche (proxy
0xc79a363a…2f607, backed by an OCR2 aggregator with 16 transmitters, sourced from TNF's LedgerLens API), but no Chainlink PoR aggregator is consumed onchain by any Ethereum reUSD contract — the onchain NAV Oracle publishes the share price, not reserves, and the Avalanche PoR feed is a standalone transparency mirror. See the Chainlink usage appendix at the end of this report. - NAV formula:
(Spread/365) + max[sUSDe(T)/sUSDe(T-7d) - 1 ; TBILL(T)/TBILL(T-7d) - 1] × (undeployed capital / total capital) + SOFR × (deployed capital / total capital). Spread = 250 bps.
Capital Deployment
- Onchain: a portion of deposits is kept in onchain backing, verified at ~52.6% of Ethereum NAV (reUSD-only, Apr 17, 2026 balances; see Collateralization). Held as USDC, USDT, USDe and sUSDe in the ICL Custodial Wallet and redemption reserves.
- Offchain (§114 Trust): Remainder deployed offchain into U.S.-domiciled §114 Reinsurance Trust Accounts, providing admitted collateral for the partner reinsurer's insurance programs
- Surplus Notes: The offchain entity issues legally binding surplus notes back to the ICL, contractually guaranteeing principal protection and the Applicable APY interest rate
- Yield Sources: Delta-neutral ETH strategy (Ethena basis trade) or T-Bills, plus protocol spread from reinsurance premiums
Reinsurance Portfolio (summary)
Re reinsures a diversified book of U.S. insurance programs. Per Re's public materials and a May 2026 press release (GlobeNewswire), the book spans ~35 carriers / insurance partners ("more than 30" per the release) and ~600K policyholders ("hundreds of thousands"), with inception-to-date premiums written of ~$409M (~$226M of it written in 2026). The premium base is therefore a multiple of reUSD TVL — Re cites roughly 7:1 authorized leverage of premium to capital. (Earlier drafts described "a ~$174M portfolio across 26+ contracts"; that conflated the reUSD token supply with the reinsurance book and is removed.) Re classifies the book as "low-volatility" and claims a ~92% combined ratio over 2022-2024 with no capital impairment. Re's own modeled loss ladder (LP memo) ties combined-ratio levels to probabilities of the portfolio reaching them: 105% → 3.9% (Re Capital attaches), 110% → 1.9% (reUSDe attaches), 115% → 0.9% (reUSD attaches), 135% → 0.03% (deep stress). All portfolio composition, carrier/policyholder counts, leverage, combined-ratio, ROE, pipeline, and stress-testing figures are sourced from Re's own materials (LP memo, intro deck, press release, app.re.xyz dashboards) — none are independently verified onchain.
Capital Structure: reUSDe (Mezzanine / Second-Loss Tranche)
reUSDe is the protocol's mezzanine / second-loss tranche (docs) — not the first-loss tranche. Per Re's own loss waterfall, the first-loss buffer is Re Capital (the reinsurer's own equity); reUSDe absorbs losses only after reinsurer equity is exhausted; reUSD is the senior, last-to-be-impaired layer. reUSDe takes underwriting losses before they reach reUSD in exchange for a higher yield: it earns the risk-free/SOFR rate plus a fixed 850 bps spread (vs +250 bps for reUSD) per docs.re.xyz ("reUSDe earns a very predictable risk free rate + a spread of 850bps"). (The retired "16-25% net annual returns" performance-share model is no longer in effect and has been removed.)
Loss waterfall (losses absorbed in order, by portfolio combined ratio):
- No losses below ~105% combined ratio.
- Re Capital (~$73M, the reinsurer's equity) — first-loss buffer, absorbs losses in the 105–110% band.
- reUSDe (mezzanine / second-loss) — absorbs losses in the 110–115% band, after Re Capital is exhausted.
- reUSD (senior) — starts taking losses above 115% combined ratio, after both Re Capital and all reUSDe reserves are depleted. (Earlier drafts placed reUSD's attachment at 135%; 135% is a deep-stress scenario, not the attachment point. reUSD attaches at 115%.)
Re's modeled impairment likelihoods are the probability of the portfolio combined ratio reaching each level: 105% → ~3.9% (Re Capital attaches), 110% → ~1.9% (reUSDe attaches), 115% → ~0.9% (reUSD attaches), 135% → ~0.03% (deep stress). The relevant figure for reUSD is therefore ~0.9% (reaching 115%), not the 0.03% at 135% that earlier drafts cited — the prior framing materially overstated how remote reUSD's loss risk is. These numbers come from a single chart in the Nov 2025 LP Memo ("Re Capital Structure and Risk-Remote Design"). The model is undisclosed: no distributional assumptions, correlation structure, simulation count, calibration window, confidence intervals, or actuarial sign-off are published. The tail figures also assume the subordinated buffer is fully intact at time of stress. Treat as Re-asserted, not independently attested.
reUSDe mechanics:
- Price based on quarterly-refreshed target NAV derived from actuarial reports; compounds daily but surplus realization occurs quarterly
- Idle capital earns sUSDe basis-trade yield until called for underwriting
- Redemptions are quarterly (72h window at fiscal quarter start), pro-rata if requests exceed capacity; unfilled rolls to next quarter
- Re's public materials describe a restoration order in which later reinsurance profits first recapitalize reUSD/reUSDe before the Re Capital buffer (not verifiable onchain).
- Issuer: reUSD and reUSDe are issued through Resilience Foundation Cayman LLC (Cayman Islands Exempted Limited Guarantee Foundation Company), per Re's Legal Disclosures. Resilience (BVI) Ltd is an affiliate service provider (administrative/operational/token-related services), not the token issuer — the earlier "issued by Resilience (BVI) Ltd" attribution (taken from RWA.xyz) was incorrect.
- reUSD is stated to be protected by subordinated assets (Re Capital + reUSDe combined); only Re Capital ~$73M is directly referenced in the LP Memo. The total subordinated buffer amount is a protocol claim, not independently verified.
Accessibility
- Deposits: KYC/AML required (via SumSub and Chainalysis). Users must pass KYC checks because a portion of protocol capital is deployed with a Cayman-regulated reinsurance company (CIMA-regulated).
- KYC on redemption — enforced onchain (verified Apr 17, 2026): every redemption entrypoint reverts with
KYCRequiredifkyc.isKYCApproved(msg.sender) == false. Checked functions in theInstantRedemptionInteractioncontract0x8aEb9453EF22Cb38abC7a3Af9c208F65C1BfE31e:redeemInstant,submitWindowRequest,adjustWindowRequest,claimWindowPayout. The same check is repeated insideInstantRedemption._processRedemptionon the user argument. A KYC revocation therefore blocks not only new deposits but also the holder's ability to redeem onchain through the protocol. Selling on a DEX remains possible because DEX routers do not gate transfers on KYC. - reUSD — Instant Redemption: available from the onchain instant liquidity buffer via
redeemInstant(uint256 shares, uint256 minPayout)on the Interaction contract (which delegates to theInstantRedemptionimplementation at0xa31DeeBB3680A3007120e74bcBdf4dF36F042a40). Atomic, same-block settlement. Onchain-verified parameters on Apr 17, 2026:minRedemption = 0.01 reUSD(1e16),maxRedemption = 1,000,000 reUSD(1e24),dailyLimitBps = 2000(20% of capacity),userLimitBps = 1000(10% per wallet),feeBps = 6(0.06%),dayPayoutToken = sUSDe. At the fastest drain rate, ~5 days to exhaust all liquid onchain reserves (20% per day). The "250 reUSD minimum" cited elsewhere is not in the public docs and contradicts the onchain parameter; treat0.01 reUSDas the contract-level floor. - reUSD — Windowed Redemption: once the instant buffer is exhausted, the protocol opens a redemption window (minimum 24 hours). Requests fulfilled pro-rata based on available capital. Proceeds must be claimed within two months.
- reUSDe — redemption works differently (per docs): no instant redemption path exists. reUSDe redemptions are quarterly-only. Request window = first 72 hours of each fiscal quarter; an "actuarial gate" at quarter-end (≤10 business days) determines Available Surplus; payouts are pro-rata against that surplus; unfilled balances auto-roll into the next quarter while retaining queue seniority. Re explicitly notes "No secondary market maker pool is promised" for reUSDe. The senior-tranche instant buffer/vault described above applies to reUSD only, not reUSDe.
- DEX Trading (Re reUSD only): Fluid reUSD/USDT DEX pool (~$11.62M — note: USDT, not USDC); Curve reUSD/sUSDe (~$1.42M) and reUSD/USDC (~$450K); Avalanche Blackhole reUSD/USDC pools (~$1.47M combined). Total DEX liquidity ~$14.96M on Apr 17, 2026 (DeFi Llama yields API, filtered by underlying token
0x5086…0c72/0x180aF87b…625Bf). Larger pools labelled "reUSD/scrvUSD", "reUSD/sfrxUSD", "reUSD/fxUSD", "reUSD/sDOLA" on Curve/Convex/Stake-DAO/Beefy are Resupply Protocol's reUSD (0x57aB1E00…) and are NOT Re reUSD exits. - Not available to U.S. persons
- Fees: Redemption fee of
6 bps(0.06%) — onchain-verified viaInstantRedemption.feeBps() = 6at0xa31DeeBB3680A3007120e74bcBdf4dF36F042a40(docs). No documented deposit fees, management fees, or performance fees. RWA.xyz reports 0.18% subscription and 0.18% redemption fees — discrepancy with docs may reflect different fee tiers or methodology. Onchain data shows ~$1,535 total deposit fees collected historically, suggesting a small deposit fee mechanism exists in the contracts (also flagged in Hacken audit finding F-2024-5214 "Unclaimed Deposit Fees Unaccounted For").
Collateralization
- Onchain reserve target: Re's public materials describe a target of ≥50% of deposits kept in onchain backing (USDC, sUSDe, and — per protocol claim — potentially T-bill wrappers such as BUIDL).
- Onchain reserves — verified Apr 17, 2026 against AUP address list: The Network Firm's Oct-2025 AUP report lists 15 Fireblocks-MPC-controlled addresses as in-scope for Re's supporting assets (
AUP-Report-2025.pdf, Procedure 3 table). All 15 were checked for USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe / BUIDL balances today. 11 are empty; 4 hold all the reserves:
| # | AUP-listed address | Chain type | Current USD value | Share (reUSD base) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0x295F67Fdb21255A3Db82964445628a706FBe689E ICL Custodial Wallet |
EOA | $24.39M (USDC $9.34M + USDT $1.99M + USDe $0.10M + sUSDe $12.96M) | 25.0% |
| 2 | 0x9eA38e09F41A9DE53972a68268BA0Dcc6d2fAdf8 Redemption Reserves Custodian |
EOA | $65.38M (sUSDe) | 67.1% |
| 4 | 0x5C454f5526e41fBE917b63475CD8CA7E4631B147 Daily Instant Redemption Vault |
Contract (RedemptionVault) |
$7.60M (sUSDe) | 7.8% |
| reUSD subtotal | ~$97.37M | 100% | ||
| 3 | 0xd4374008c88321Eb2e59ABD311156C44B25831e9 reUSDe ICL Custodial Wallet — EXCLUDED from reUSD total |
EOA | $2.56M (USDe $0.99M + sUSDe $1.57M) | — (backs reUSDe) |
| 5 | 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 ICL |
Contract (proxy) | $0 | — |
| 6 | 0xE1886BE2bA8B2496c2044a77516F63a734193082 |
Contract | $258 (dust) | — |
| 7-15 | 0x19af…5896, 0x4F1f…DaE4, 0x802e…0291, 0x9AB6…1FE3, 0xb22a…fbe1, 0xD75E…eDE9, 0xe132…9d23, 0xfB60…4BB0, 0xfd40…B852 | 9 × EOA | $0 | — |
(sUSDe valued at the onchain sUSDe/USDe exchange rate of 1.22757 via convertToAssets, assuming USDe ≈ $1.)
Reserve attribution (corrected per Re): address 3 (0xd4374008…B25831e9, $2.56M) is the reUSDe ICL Custodial Wallet and backs reUSDe, not reUSD; it is therefore excluded from the reUSD reserve total. This is a Re/team attribution — onchain, the address is simply another EOA in the Fireblocks set and cannot be independently tied to reUSDe vs reUSD. Excluding it: reUSD-only onchain reserves are ~$97.37M (down from the ~$99.93M previously reported, which had folded in reUSDe collateral).
Coverage ratio (reUSD-only): $97.37M / $185.10M Ethereum NAV = ~52.6% (~52.1% vs $186.72M total cross-chain NAV). The protocol-stated ≥50% target is still met, but with only ~2.6 percentage points of headroom, not the ~4 pp implied by the earlier (overstated) $99.93M base.
Concentration concerns (onchain-verified, reUSD-only base):
- ~88% of onchain reUSD reserves are in sUSDe, not USDC ($85.94M of $97.37M). This inherits Ethena counterparty / smart-contract risk and a 7-day cooldown to unstake sUSDe → USDe. Only ~$9.34M of the reserves (≈9.6%) is immediately-redeemable USDC; ~$1.99M (~2.0%) is USDT.
- No BUIDL or T-bill-wrapper balances were found at any of the ICL / vault / custodian addresses (Apr 17, 2026), even though Re's materials mention such assets as potential reserves. Apart from USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe, the only non-dust holding is ~1.35M
reUSDsUSDeCurve LP tokens at the ICL Custodial Wallet (protocol-owned liquidity for the reUSD/sUSDe pool; excluded from the reserve total above). All other token balances at these addresses are airdrop spam or dust (<$500). - The ICL contract
0x4691…3093itself holds $0 in reserves — assets sit at the Custodial Wallet (an EOA) and at the Redemption Reserves Custodian (also an EOA).
Custody / asset-movement surface — ~92% of reserves sit at plain EOAs (critical):
Of the $97.37M onchain reUSD reserve, $89.77M (~92.2%) sits at two plain EOAs: the ICL Custodial Wallet (~$24.4M) and the Redemption Reserves Custodian (~$65.4M). Only $7.60M (the Daily Instant Redemption Vault) sits behind contract-enforced role gating. (The reUSDe ICL Custodial Wallet
0xd4374008…B25831e9, ~$2.6M, is a third EOA of the same kind but backs reUSDe, not reUSD, so it is excluded here.) From the chain's perspective, each EOA is indistinguishable from an ordinary single-key wallet. One ECDSA signature, onetransfer(...)call, and those funds move anywhere — no onchain delay, no destination whitelist, no role check.Re's documentation and the October 2025 AUP describe these as "Fireblocks MPC (Multi-Party Computation) wallets" in which "the associated private key is split into encrypted 'shares'" (AUP Report 2025, footnote 2). Important caveats about what the AUP actually proves:
- The AUP procedure for the Fireblocks assets was "observe Re Management access the Fireblocks blockchain-based MPC wallet" and then "query the blockchain-based addresses observed for Supporting Assets". This is watching someone log in; it is not cryptographic verification that N-of-M signers are required for any given transaction. TNF relied on Re's assertion of the MPC structure.
- The AUP explicitly disclaims operating-effectiveness testing of internal controls: "We did not perform procedures regarding the operating effectiveness of the Re's internal controls."
- The AUP was also scoped to exclude 1:1 backing, TVL, and token valuations: "We did not perform procedures over specific aspects of the Re Protocol, including but not limited to … 1:1 backing of reserves to the tokens or the total value locked (TVL) of the Re Protocol."
Onchain, the EOAs have no code — no Safe multisig, no timelock wrapper, no onchain-whitelisted destination set, no per-asset spending caps. Whatever Fireblocks policies exist (transaction whitelists, per-asset limits, approval workflows) and whatever the real MPC quorum is are entirely offchain and unverifiable by anyone outside Re. The 48-hour Timelock does NOT protect these reserves — it only gates governance actions routed through
TimelockController(upgrades, role changes).What's needed to drain the $89.8M reUSD reserve onchain:
- If the claimed N-of-M MPC is real and Fireblocks policies are tight → compromise the policy + compromise or collude signer quorum → 1 signed tx.
- If Fireblocks policies are permissive → signer-quorum compromise / collusion alone → 1 signed tx.
- If an insider with quorum access is malicious → 1 signed tx.
This is the single largest unmitigated custody risk in the system. The AUP provides evidence that the specific address list is in Re's MPC setup, not that unauthorized movement would be prevented by multi-party signing.
Onchain buffer: Instant redemption vault and Redemption Reserves Custodian hold ~$72.98M of sUSDe plus $0 USDC for immediate redemptions (USDC instant exits unavailable under current config; see Liquidity).
Offchain trust: §114 Reinsurance Trust holds cash and T-Bills in NAIC-compliant banks; Re's public materials name these as "an independent bank / custodian" without disclosing specific counterparty names. The independently-verifiable attestations of these balances are (a) the Oct 31, 2025 Agreed-Upon Procedures report by The Network Firm (
AUP-Report-2025.pdf) and (b) the live Chainlink "Re Offchain Reserves" PoR feed on Avalanche (0xc79a363a…2f607, ~$176.8M on June 17, 2026), which publishes TNF's LedgerLens attestation through Chainlink's signed OCR2 infrastructure. The PoR feed is a meaningful transparency upgrade but is not an independent second source (it transports the same TNF attestation), is not consumed by reUSD's Ethereum contracts, and is labeled "non-value-securing" with an accuracy disclaimer (see the Chainlink usage appendix).Surplus Note protection: Surplus notes rank junior to policyholders but contractually protect depositor principal
Re Capital buffer: ~$73M subordinated first-loss layer (the reinsurer's equity) ahead of reUSDe and reUSD; absorbs losses in the 105–110% combined-ratio band
reUSDe as backstop: reUSDe is the mezzanine / second-loss layer (not first-loss). It absorbs losses in the 110–115% band, after Re Capital is exhausted, before losses reach reUSD. Per Re's model, reUSD's loss likelihood is ~0.9% (portfolio reaching its 115% attachment), not 0.03% — the 0.03% figure corresponds to a 135% deep-stress level, well beyond reUSD's attachment point
Provability
- reUSD price: Updated daily by a Chainlink-Functions-driven
NAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6callingSharePriceCalculator.setSharePrice. The NAV computation itself is not programmatically onchain — Chainlink Functions runs JS offchain (DONfun-ethereum-mainnet-1, subscription85) and returns a single NAV value. Onchain safeguards: Chainlink Automation triggers daily at 23:45 UTC;NAVConsumer.maxDeviationBps = 1000(10%) enforces a deviation guard; Hacken audited the NAV Oracle in Apr 2025. Residual concern: admin/updater roles onNAVConsumerandPRICE_SETTER_ROLEonSharePriceCalculatorare both held by a single EOA that can bypass the guard. - Onchain reserves: Visible onchain via the ICL contract and Redemption Reserves Custodian
- Offchain reserves: Attested by The Network Firm (third-party accountant with read-only access) and published onchain via a live Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve feed (verified June 17, 2026). The feed — "Re Offchain Reserves," proxy
0xc79a363a…2f607on Avalanche (data.chain.link) — is a genuine Chainlink PoR product (in Chainlink's reference directory under pathre-reserves, Product Type "Proof of Reserve," backed by anAccessControlledOCR2Aggregatorwith 16 transmitters, last updated June 17, 2026 at ~$176.8M). This corrects this report's earlier conclusion that no Chainlink PoR feed existed — it does, on Avalanche. The earlier directory check (reference-data-directory.vercel.app/feeds-mainnet.json) was Ethereum-only and the feed lives on Avalanche. Caveats that remain material: (a) the data source is TNF's LedgerLens™ API, so the feed transports the same offchain attestation rather than adding an independent verifier; (b) Chainlink's listing marks it "non-value-securing" with an explicit disclaimer that neither TNF nor Chainlink attests to the accuracy of the balance data; (c) it is not consumed by any Ethereum reUSD contract (it does not gate pricing or redemptions); and (d) it reports "Re Offchain Reserves" generically, not a reUSD-only number. The actual onchain Chainlink dependency for reUSD's pricing is still thesUSDe/USDprice aggregator (0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099). See the updated Chainlink usage appendix. - Insurance performance: Reinsurance returns are inherently offchain and depend on claim experience over multi-year treaty periods
- Minting requires backing (ICL path): All ICL deposit paths (
deposit,depositFromCustodian,processPrestakedDeposit) enforcesafeTransferFrom— backing tokens must be transferred to the ICL before reUSD is minted (verified in source at implementation0x06d4acc104b974cd99bf22e4572f48a051e59670). However, the reUSD token contract has an unrestrictedmint(address, uint256)gated only byMINTER_ROLE. - MINTER_ROLE holders (verified via RoleGranted logs on Apr 17, 2026): THREE contracts hold the role, not one:
InsuranceCapitalLayer0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093— backed mint path.InstantRedemption0xa31DeeBB3680A3007120e74bcBdf4dF36F042a40— burns reUSD on redemption; uses MINTER_ROLE becausemintandburntypically share the role in this codebase.ShareTokenMinterBurner0x0dFb42aa18CEeD719617cd554304F6cA412A6b18— LayerZero OFT wrapper. Only the registeredadaptercan callmint/burn. TheadapterisReMintBurnAdapter0x2BB4046022B9161f3F84Ad8E35cac1d5946e0e85, a LayerZero OFT with onchain rate limits of2,500,000 reUSD / 24h(inbound and outbound) per peer chain. There is no token-level backing check on this mint path by design — cross-chain OFTs conserve supply by burning on the source chain. Risk: bothShareTokenMinterBurner.ownerandReMintBurnAdapter.ownerare the same EOA0x6C15B25E9750Dccb698C1a4023f34015bFe57649(~0.099 ETH balance). Compromise of this key would let an attacker redirect the adapter and mint up to the 2.5M/day rate limit on Ethereum per connected peer chain.
- If
MINTER_ROLEwere granted to another address via Governance Safe, that address could mint without a backing check at the token layer.
Liquidity Risk
Primary Exit Mechanisms
- Instant Redemption: From the onchain buffer. Atomic, same-block. Available until buffer is exhausted (< 1% of supply triggers window-only mode)
- Quarterly Redemption: Processed pro-rata with available capital not reserved for reinsurance plus actuarially released funds
- DEX Swap: Sell reUSD on Curve reUSD/USDC pool
DeFi Integrations
Onchain-verified integrations that consume Re Protocol's reUSD (0x5086…0c72):
| Protocol | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Fluid DEX | DEX | reUSD/USDT pool (~$11.62M TVL, ~$1.67M daily volume). Largest trading venue. |
| Fluid Lending | Lending | Three lending markets supply reUSD: ~$23.58M (vs USDT), ~$23.34M (vs USDC), ~$15.35M (vs fxUSD). Total reUSD supplied ~$62.3M. |
| Curve | DEX | reUSD/sUSDe (~$1.42M), reUSD/USDC (~$450K). (reUSD/scrvUSD, reUSD/sfrxUSD, reUSD/fxUSD, reUSD/sDOLA pools are Resupply reUSD, not Re's.) |
| Morpho | Lending | Re reUSD vaults (~$4.74M + ~$2.29M ≈ $7.0M). PT-REUSD-25JUN2026 Pendle-PT markets also reference Re reUSD indirectly. |
| Pendle | Yield | reUSD yield-tokenization market (~$8.42M TVL). |
| Beefy | Vault | reUSD auto-compounding vault (~$786K). |
| Stake-DAO | Vault | reUSD vault (~$428K). |
| Blackhole (Avalanche) | DEX | reUSD/USDC pools on Blackhole CLMM + AMM (~$962K + ~$510K ≈ $1.47M). |
Combined ~$69.3M of Re reUSD is supplied into Fluid + Morpho lending markets onchain.
Liquidity Summary
- Total DEX Liquidity (onchain-verified, Re reUSD only): ~$14.96M across Fluid, Curve, and Blackhole (~8.0% of the then ~$186.7M market cap). Fluid reUSD/USDT (~$11.62M) is the dominant venue (~78% of DEX depth). Significantly smaller than the initial "~$26.2M" figure, which erroneously included Resupply-reUSD Curve pools. Note: the DEX-liquidity, redemption-buffer, and outstanding-token figures in this section are the Apr 17, 2026 onchain snapshot; they were not re-measured for the June 17 reassessment. Against the current ~$172.2M reUSD market cap (see Key metrics), the same ~$14.96M would be ~8.7% — but the numerator is the April snapshot, so treat the ratio as April-basis. 24h token volume has also fallen to ~$1.2M (from ~$7.3M), thinning spot-market exit depth further.
- 24h Trading Volume (token-level, CoinGecko): ~$1.2M (June 17, 2026; down from ~$7.3M on Apr 17).
- Instant redemption buffer (Apr 17, 2026, onchain): The Daily Instant Redemption Vault at
0x5C454f5526e41fBE917b63475CD8CA7E4631B147holds0USDC and6.188MsUSDe. ThecustodialWallet(labeled "Redemption Reserves Custodian" in this report)0x9eA38e09F41A9DE53972a68268BA0Dcc6d2fAdf8is an EOA and holds0USDC and53.263MsUSDe. The configureddayPayoutTokenis sUSDe (not USDC) on Apr 17, 2026, so instant redemptions settle into sUSDe under current config. - Instant Redemption Interaction Contract:
0x8aEb9453EF22Cb38abC7a3Af9c208F65C1BfE31e— exposesredeemInstant(uint256 shares, uint256 minPayout)for instant redemptions. - Onchain capital (Apr 17, 2026): ICL Custodial Wallet
0x295F67Fdb21255A3Db82964445628a706FBe689Eholds9.344MUSDC +10.496MsUSDe. ICL contract itself holds $0. - Quarterly queue: Pro-rata fulfillment, may not be fully met if capital is locked in reinsurance
- KYC required: Both for deposit and redemption through the protocol
- Multi-chain: Available on 6+ chains. Liquidity concentrated on Ethereum Curve pools (~$16M) with ~$1.5M on Avalanche.
Centralization & Control Risks
Governance
- Governance (onchain-verified): A Safe 3-of-5 multisig at
0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd(SafeProxy; 5 owners, threshold 3) holds DEFAULT_ADMIN + UPGRADER on reUSD and ICL, and PROPOSER + CANCELLER on the Timelock. The protocol docs also describe additional MPC-controlled admin EOAs (Oracle, Redemptions, Access, Custodian); those EOAs exist onchain, but theN-of-MMPC quorum is offchain and cannot be verified.- Oracle admin EOA:
0x49BC5A88…9212A0ee— no timelock (directsetSharePricecapability implied). - Redemptions admin EOA:
0xEE16bE03…310c47f8. - Access admin EOA:
0x80a62B72…812fECAFc(administersAccessManager0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8; onchain-observed callinggrantRole/labelRole). - Custodian manager EOA:
0x9b6d7f2d…cEbE6eC9— holdsCUSTODIAN_MANAGER_ROLEon ICL (onchain-verified). - Timelock executor EOA:
0x4BFea59b…740738F3(onchain-verified).
- Oracle admin EOA:
- Upgrade Pattern: UUPS / ERC1967 upgradeable contracts (reUSD and ICL implementations verified).
- Upgrade Authority: Governance Safe → Timelock Controller (
0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93). TimelockgetMinDelay() = 172800seconds (48 hours, onchain-verified). - Timelock: 48-hour timelock on upgrades and role changes routed through Timelock. The
setSharePricepath has no onchain timelock or guardrail — price writes take effect immediately. - No onchain governance: Protocol is currently governed by an expert-led council (Resilience Foundation). Planned transition to DAO in the future.
- MPC signers: Re Team members — not publicly identified.
Programmability
- reUSD price: NOT programmatically computed. The NAV itself is produced offchain by a Chainlink Functions JS job, delivered onchain by
NAVConsumer, and stored inSharePriceCalculator. Onchain, the NAV Consumer enforces a 10% deviation cap per update (maxDeviationBps = 1000). A Chainlink PoR feed for Re's offchain reserves is live on Avalanche, but no PoR aggregator is consumed onchain by the Ethereum reUSD contracts to gate pricing or redemption (see the Chainlink usage appendix). The calculator itself has no guardrail onsetSharePrice; the admin EOA holds the role and can bypass the NAV Consumer path. - Deposits: Require KYC verification through the KYC Registry contract
- Redemptions: Instant redemptions are programmatic (from buffer). Quarterly redemptions involve admin-managed processes
- Capital deployment: Offchain, managed by the protocol team through the Fireblocks custody infrastructure
External Dependencies
- Chainlink: Verified onchain use is (a) Chainlink Functions + Automation driving the daily reUSD NAV/share-price update (Ethereum), (b) the Chainlink
sUSDe/USDprice feed used for collateral pricing (Ethereum), and (c) a live Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve feed "Re Offchain Reserves" on Avalanche (0xc79a363a…2f607, TNF LedgerLens source). The PoR feed is a transparency mirror only — it is not consumed by reUSD's Ethereum pricing/redemption logic. - The Network Firm: Third-party accountant for daily offchain reserve verification
- Ethena: USDe/sUSDe for basis-trade yield source
- Fireblocks: Custody for idle onchain capital (daily sweeps from ICL to Fireblocks vault)
- §114 Reinsurance Trust: Offchain U.S.-domiciled trust bank for regulatory collateral
- Cayman Reinsurer: Partner reinsurance company (CIMA-licensed, Class B(iii))
- SumSub / Chainalysis: KYC/AML verification
- Multiple blockchains: Cross-chain deployments on Ethereum, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, Katana, BNB Chain, Ink
Operational Risk
- Team: CEO Karn Saroya (publicly known, LinkedIn/Twitter). Previously co-founded Cover (YC-backed insurtech) and Stylekick (acquired by Shopify); part of early Shopify team. Underwriting leadership: James Norris (Chief Underwriting Officer, 30+ years insurance/reinsurance, former President of Lapis Resources; appointment confirmed by Reinsurance News) and Jonathan Lim (Head of Underwriting, actuarial background). (An earlier draft attributed reinsurance leadership to the "former CEO of Willis Programs"; per Re that is an adviser/board role, not the operating underwriting lead — corrected.)
- Company: Re (re.xyz). Founded 2022. Token issuer: Resilience Foundation Cayman LLC (Cayman Islands Exempted Limited Guarantee Foundation Company, per Re's Legal Disclosures). Resilience (BVI) Ltd is an affiliate service provider, not the issuer — the earlier "Resilience BVI Ltd. issuer" attribution (from RWA.xyz) was incorrect. Governance controlled by Resilience Foundation.
- Legal Structure: Partner reinsurance company (Cover Re SPC) domiciled in Cayman Islands, regulated by CIMA. Offchain trust accounts in U.S. jurisdiction (§114 Trust, NAIC-compliant banks). Token issuer (Resilience Foundation) domiciled in the Cayman Islands; the BVI entity is a service affiliate.
- Investors: $14M seed round at $100M post-money valuation. Investors include Electric Capital, Tribe Capital, Stratos, SiriusPoint, Exor, Defy, Framework Ventures, Morgan Creek Digital.
- Custody: Re's public materials (
docs.re.xyz) name Fireblocks MPC custody for idle onchain assets. The AUP-Report-2025 corroborates that Re operates a Fireblocks MPC wallet set covering the 15 listed addresses but does not cryptographically verify the N-of-M quorum. Public documentation does not name specific banking counterparties for the offchain §114 Trust assets. - Documentation: Comprehensive documentation at docs.re.xyz. Clear description of mechanism, risks, and investor protections.
- Runtime Monitoring: ChainAnalysis for onchain transaction monitoring.
- Incident Response: Emergency pause mechanism exists. Recovery wallets designated for each ICL (e.g.,
0xDf6bF2713b5c7CA724E684657280bC407938F447for initial ICL). - KYC/AML: Required for all participants (SumSub + Chainalysis). Revoked KYC = request cancelled, tokens returned.
- Not available to U.S. persons and may be restricted in other jurisdictions.
- Written Premiums (Re-reported): ~$409M premiums written inception-to-date (~$226M in 2026), per Re's Capital Strategy dashboard / May 2026 press release; book spans ~35 carriers / "more than 30 insurance partners" and ~600K ("hundreds of thousands") policyholders. Multi-billion-dollar pipeline. Protocol has demonstrated real-world insurance traction (figures Re-reported, not independently verified).
Monitoring
reUSD Price Monitoring
Share Price Calculator:
0xd1D104a7515989ac82F1AFDa15a23650411b05B8- Monitor reUSD price changes daily. Current: ~$1.084 (onchain
getSharePrice()=1083903541862749952, June 17, 2026; was1072426668551449984/ ~$1.072 on Apr 17). - Alert: If price decreases (should only ever increase under normal operation).
- Alert: If price growth stops for >48 hours (indicates oracle feed interruption or yield issue).
- Alert: Any new member granted
PRICE_SETTER_ROLEon the Share Price Calculator (currently0x6c15b25e…57649andNAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb…2b4b6). - Alert (Critical): Any
setSharePricecall whosemsg.senderis NOT theNAVConsumer— this is a bypass of the audited NAV path.
- Monitor reUSD price changes daily. Current: ~$1.084 (onchain
NAV Consumer (Chainlink Functions + Automation):
0x84d4eaeb10f9e57b67622f667c6c13e22fa4b2b6- Alert (Critical):
maxDeviationBpschanges (currently1000= 10%);deviationCheckEnabledflipped tofalse;automationEnabledflipped tofalse;pausedflipped totrue. - Alert (Critical): Any call to
forceNAVUpdate(admin override; minimum 4h interval). - Alert (Critical): Role changes on
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE,ADMIN_ROLE,UPDATER_ROLE,EMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLE,KEEPER_ROLE. - Alert (High):
configure(uint64,bytes32,string,bytes)— changes Chainlink Functions subscription / DON / source code. - Alert (High): Daily NAV update did not fire within the configured time window (default target 23:45 UTC).
- Alert (Critical):
ICL and Redemption Monitoring
reUSD ICL:
0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093- Monitor for large deposits/withdrawals (>$1M).
- Monitor total assets under management.
Daily Instant Redemption Vault:
0x5C454f5526e41fBE917b63475CD8CA7E4631B147- Monitor buffer balance. Alert if buffer drops below 1% of reUSD supply (triggers window-only mode).
- Monitor for rapid drawdowns indicating potential stress.
Reserve EOAs — primary custody risk: ~92% of onchain reUSD reserves are at two plain EOAs (the ICL Custodial Wallet + Redemption Reserves Custodian; a third EOA holds reUSDe collateral). All are part of the 15 Fireblocks-MPC-controlled addresses listed in the AUP-Report-2025. No onchain outflow restriction applies.
- ICL Custodial Wallet (EOA):
0x295F67Fdb21255A3Db82964445628a706FBe689E— current balance ~$24.4M.- Alert (Critical): Any transfer (USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe) to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (Ethena sUSDe/USDe contracts, Redemption Reserves Custodian, Daily Instant Redemption Vault, Fireblocks-pattern sweep addresses beginning
0x34b6…). First-time destinations = incident. - Alert (High): Any outbound transfer >$1M.
- Alert (Critical): Any transfer (USDC / USDT / USDe / sUSDe) to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (Ethena sUSDe/USDe contracts, Redemption Reserves Custodian, Daily Instant Redemption Vault, Fireblocks-pattern sweep addresses beginning
- Redemption Reserves Custodian (EOA):
0x9eA38e09F41A9DE53972a68268BA0Dcc6d2fAdf8— current balance ~$65.4M.- Alert (Critical): Any sUSDe transfer to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (only
0x5C45…B147RedemptionVault and sUSDe/USDe staking contracts observed to date). - Alert (High): Any single outbound >$5M.
- Alert (Critical): Any sUSDe transfer to a destination NOT on the historical allow-list (only
- reUSDe ICL Custodial Wallet (EOA)
0xd4374008…B25831e9: — currently holds ~$2.6M in USDe+sUSDe. Per Re this backs reUSDe, not reUSD (so it is excluded from the reUSD coverage ratio), but it is the same Fireblocks-EOA custody pattern and worth monitoring.- Alert (Critical): Any outbound transfer. Small size makes every movement worth a manual look.
- All 12 other AUP-listed addresses (currently empty or dust): monitor for any incoming deposit >$1M and then for any subsequent outgoing transfer. Sudden use of a previously-empty AUP address is a governance signal (either new custody rotation or an unauthorized movement).
- ICL Custodial Wallet (EOA):
Instant Redemption Interaction Contract:
0x8aEb9453EF22Cb38abC7a3Af9c208F65C1BfE31e- Monitor threshold value.
- Alert: On changes to daily or per-wallet redemption caps.
Governance & Upgrade Monitoring
Oracle admin EOA (MPC 3-of-5 per docs):
0x49BC5A880f77247A348764DdB95951cd9212A0ee- Alert: On any price feed configuration changes; on any new
PRICE_SETTER_ROLEgrant on Share Price Calculator.
- Alert: On any price feed configuration changes; on any new
Access admin EOA (MPC 5-of-8 per docs):
0x80a62B72dF1136aCBc57141FB67Aa46812fECAFc— admin ofAccessManager0x3f0DA1C363e34802C6f12F9C27276dC0e6696FD8- Alert: On any role assignment or revocation in
AccessManager; onMINTER_ROLEgrant on reUSD token.
- Alert: On any role assignment or revocation in
Governance Safe (3-of-5, onchain-verified):
0x8EEc10616802Ef639ca55C98Ac856553FadeFbAd- Alert: On any transaction execution, owner change, or threshold change.
Timelock Controller:
0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93— the 48h delay betweenCallScheduledandCallExecutedis the primary review window for any privileged action; the monitor must fire the moment something is queued, not when it executes.- Alert: On
CallScheduled(bytes32 id, uint256 index, address target, uint256 value, bytes data, bytes32 predecessor, uint256 delay)— decodetarget/dataand surface the decoded function call. Every scheduled call deserves a manual review before the 48h window expires. - Alert: On
CallExecuted(bytes32 id, uint256 index, address target, uint256 value, bytes data)— confirm the execution matches what was scheduled and did not diverge (OZ TimelockController replays the same payload, so any mismatch would be an upstream monitoring bug). - Alert: On
Cancelled(bytes32 id)— a Safe-initiated cancel is informational; a cancel originating from anything other than the Governance Safe (0x8EEc10…) or addresses withCANCELLER_ROLEis an incident.
- Alert: On
UUPS Proxy Upgrades: Monitor for
Upgradedevents on reUSD token and ICL contracts.- Alert: Immediately on any implementation change (48-hour timelock provides review window, so this should have been preceded by a
CallScheduledevent ≥48h earlier — absence of that precursor is an incident).
- Alert: Immediately on any implementation change (48-hour timelock provides review window, so this should have been preceded by a
Liquidity Monitoring
Fluid reUSD/USDT pool: Monitor TVL and volume. Largest trading venue by volume (~$11.6M TVL).
- Alert: If Fluid pool TVL drops below $5M.
Curve Re reUSD pools — only two pools actually pair Re's reUSD (
0x5086…0c72): reUSD/sUSDe and reUSD/USDC. (Curve pools labelled reUSD/scrvUSD, reUSD/sfrxUSD, reUSD/fxUSD, reUSD/sDOLA use Resupply's reUSD0x57aB1E00…and must NOT be monitored as Re liquidity.) Monitor TVL and balance ratio.- Alert: If total Curve Re reUSD DEX liquidity drops below $1M (currently ~$1.87M combined).
- Alert: If any pool imbalance exceeds 80/20 in either direction.
Avalanche Blackhole reUSD/USDC (CLMM + AMM, Re's reUSD
0x180aF87b…625Bf): Monitor TVL.- Alert: If combined Avalanche TVL drops below $500K (currently ~$1.47M).
CoinGecko reUSD price: Monitor for deviations from expected share price.
- Alert: If CoinGecko price deviates >2% from onchain share price.
Offchain Reserve Monitoring
Chainlink "Re Offchain Reserves" PoR feed (Avalanche)
0xc79a363a…2f607: now a directly-monitorable onchain reserve signal (calllatestRoundData(); decimals = 8; ~$176.8M on June 17, 2026). Caveat: it reports "Re Offchain Reserves" generically (not reUSD-only) and is sourced from TNF's LedgerLens attestation, so it is not an independent cross-check.- Alert: if the feed's
updatedAtgoes stale beyond its normal heartbeat (observe the cadence for a calendar month first). - Alert: if the reported reserve value drops materially or falls below expected offchain backing.
- Alert: if the feed's
The Network Firm attestation: the only Network Firm engagement publicly verified is the single Agreed-Upon Procedures report dated Oct 31, 2025 (published Dec 17, 2025). No onchain or public evidence establishes a daily or weekly cadence; the "daily attestation" phrasing in Re's docs is a protocol claim, not an observed publication pattern. The Avalanche PoR feed above is the primary onchain reserve signal; the AUP and Re's transparency dashboard are the supporting offchain channels.
- Action: before relying on an "X-hours stale" alert, confirm the actual publication cadence with Re or by observing the transparency dashboard / PoR feed heartbeat for a calendar month.
- Alert: if reported reserves fall below total reUSD supply × share price.
- Alert: if a new AUP report appears with an address list that differs from the 15 addresses in
AUP-Report-2025.
Onchain coverage ratio: Compute
(USDC + USDT + USDe + sUSDe_in_USDe_terms)across the reUSD-backing Fireblocks-MPC addresses in the AUP-Report-2025 — i.e. exclude the reUSDe ICL Custodial Wallet0xd4374008…B25831e9— divided byreUSD Ethereum totalSupply × getSharePrice(). Currently ~52.6% (reUSD-only).- Alert if coverage drops below 50% (Re's stated floor).
- Alert if coverage drops below 52% (headroom erosion — only ~2.6 pp of headroom remains).
- Alert if the sUSDe share of reserves exceeds 92% or the USDC share drops below 7% (current split: sUSDe ~88% / USDC ~9.6%).
- Alert on first appearance of BUIDL or another T-bill-wrapper balance at any reserve address.
Monitoring Frequency
| Category | Frequency | Priority |
|---|---|---|
Timelock CallScheduled / CallExecuted / Cancelled / MinDelayChange |
Real-time | Critical |
| Governance Safe tx execution / owner / threshold changes | Real-time | Critical |
| UUPS proxy upgrade events | Real-time | Critical |
| Access role changes (reUSD MINTER_ROLE, ICL admin, Timelock PROPOSER/EXECUTOR/CANCELLER) | Real-time | Critical |
Share Price Calculator PRICE_SETTER_ROLE grant / revoke |
Real-time | Critical |
| Instant redemption cap changes | Real-time | Critical |
| reUSD share price | Daily | High |
| Instant redemption buffer (USDC + sUSDe) | Every 6 hours | High |
| Onchain coverage ratio (reserves / NAV) + composition | Every 6 hours | High |
| Instant redemption interaction events | Every 6 hours | High |
| The Network Firm offchain attestation publication | Daily | High |
| DEX pool TVL/balance (Fluid reUSD/USDT + Curve) | Hourly | Medium |
| Total supply changes (Ethereum + cross-chain) | Daily | Medium |
Reassessment Triggers
- Time-based: Reassess in 6 months (September 2026) or sooner if instant redemption vault remains empty for >30 days
- Governance-based: Reassess after roles are changed, or funds are
- Incident-based: Reassess after any exploit, governance change, reinsurer insolvency, or material claim event
- Liquidity-based: Reassess if DEX liquidity drops below $5M or if instant redemption vault remains empty for >30 days
- Regulatory-based: Reassess if CIMA regulatory status changes or new jurisdictional restrictions apply
Appendix: Contract Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ VAULT / TOKEN LAYER │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
│ │ reUSD Token │◄──│ Share Price │◄── PRICE_SETTER_ROLE │
│ │ (ERC-20, │ │ Calculator │ (EOA calls │
│ │ UUPS Proxy) │ │ 0xd1D1..11b05B8 │ setSharePrice) │
│ │ 0x5086..0c72 │ └──────────────────────┘ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ (NAVConsumer: 10% onchain deviation cap; │
│ admin EOA can bypass via direct setSharePrice) │
│ │ mint/burn │
│ ┌──────▼───────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Insurance Capital Layer │───►│ ICL Custodial Wallet │ │
│ │ (ICL) │ │ (Fireblocks) │ │
│ │ 0x4691..3093 │ │ 0x295F..689E │ │
│ └──────┬───────────────────┘ └───────────┬─────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────▼───────────────────┐ │ sweep │
│ │ Daily Instant Redemption │ ▼ │
│ │ Vault │ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
│ │ 0x5C45..B147 │ │ Offchain Deployment │ │
│ └──────────────────────────┘ │ (offchain §114 Trust)│ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PROTOCOL LAYER │
│ │
│ ┌────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Deposit Token │ │ KYC Registry │ │
│ │ Registry │ │ (SumSub/Chainalysis)│ │
│ │ 0x73d3..03F6 │ │ 0x82F1..9995 │ │
│ └────────────────────┘ └────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌────────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Decentralized Fund │ │ Redemption Reserves│ │
│ │ 0xF044..72f2 │ │ Custodian (EOA) │ │
│ └────────────────────┘ │ 0x9eA3..ADF8 │ │
│ └────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ UNDERLYING LAYER │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ Chainlink │ │ The Network Firm │ │ §114 Reinsurance│ │
│ │ (Price Feed + │ │ (Daily offchain │ │ Trust (U.S.) │ │
│ │ Proof of │ │ attestation) │ │ Cash + T-Bills │ │
│ │ Reserve) │ │ │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ Ethena (USDe) │ │ Cayman Reinsurer │ │
│ │ (Basis trade │ │ (CIMA-licensed, │ │
│ │ yield source) │ │ Class B(iii)) │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GOVERNANCE │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Oracle Admin EOA │ │ Redemptions Admin │ │
│ │ MPC 3-of-5 (docs) │ │ MPC 3-of-5 (docs) │ │
│ │ 0x49BC..0Aee │ │ 0xEE16..47f8 │ │
│ │ no onchain timelock │ │ 48h timelock (docs) │ │
│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Access Admin EOA │ │ Custodian Manager │ │
│ │ MPC 5-of-8 (docs) │ │ (CUSTODIAN_MGR_ROLE)│ │
│ │ 0x80a6..AFc │ │ 0x9b6d..eC9 │ │
│ │ admins AccessManager│ │ Add/remove │ │
│ │ 0x3f0D..6FD8 │ │ custodians (ICL) │ │
│ └─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Governance Safe (3-of-5, onchain) │ │
│ │ 0x8EEc10..FadeFbAd │ │
│ │ DEFAULT_ADMIN + UPGRADER on reUSD and ICL; │ │
│ │ PROPOSER + CANCELLER on Timelock │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Timelock Controller (getMinDelay = 48h) │ │
│ │ 0x69dDEa..57FCA93 │ │
│ │ Executor: 0x4BFea59b..740738F3 (EOA) │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Fund Flow:
User ──USDC──► ICL (KYC gate) ──mint──► reUSD Token
ICL ──sweep──► Custodial Wallet ──deploy──► §114 Trust (offchain)
§114 Trust ──surplus notes──► ICL (principal + yield guarantee)
Network Firm attestation ──► PRICE_SETTER EOA ──► setSharePrice on Share Price Calc ──► reUSD price
Network Firm (LedgerLens) ──► Chainlink PoR feed "Re Offchain Reserves" (Avalanche; transparency mirror, not consumed by Ethereum reUSD logic)
Chainlink sUSDe/USD ──► SimpleOracle ──► PriceRouter (sUSDe leg only)
Trust Boundaries:
⚠ Onchain/offchain boundary at ICL Custodial Wallet sweep
⚠ Share price is written by an admin EOA with no onchain deviation cap
⚠ Redemption Reserves Custodian (0x9eA3..ADF8) is an EOA
⚠ MINTER_ROLE held by THREE contracts on reUSD (ICL, InstantRedemption, ShareTokenMinterBurner)
⚠ KYC Registry gates all deposits and protocol redemptions
Appendix: Chainlink usage by Re Protocol — what is real vs what is marketing
Verified Apr 17, 2026.
Re's documentation ties the protocol's reserve and price publication to Chainlink. The relevant quotes:
| Source page | Quote |
|---|---|
| Security and Audits | "Off-chain bank balances are verified daily by The Network Firm and published via Chainlink. The Network Firm also verifies ownership and balances of protocol custody wallets." |
| How the Re Protocol Works | "Idle funds are held in a Fireblocks vault under multisig. Balances are published daily to a Chainlink oracle. Proof-of-reserves, publicly auditable." |
| How the Re Protocol Works | "On-Chain Mirror: Trust balances, premium inflows, and claim outflows are hashed and pushed to Chainlink, giving 24/7 proof of funds." |
| How the Re Protocol Works | "Chainlink Oracles: Publish price feeds, trust balances, surplus-note schedules, and redemption queues." |
| What is reUSD? | "A JSON price feed is pushed on-chain via Chainlink" |
Update (June 17, 2026): an earlier version of this appendix concluded that no Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve feed for Re existed and that the "proof-of-reserves" claim was an overclaim. That conclusion is now corrected — a live Chainlink PoR feed for "Re Offchain Reserves" was confirmed on Avalanche (item 4 below). The earlier directory check was Ethereum-only; the feed lives on Avalanche. The nuanced caveats (offchain data source, non-value-securing label, not consumed by Ethereum reUSD logic) still hold.
What's actually onchain (four Chainlink integrations, verified):
- Chainlink Price Feed —
sUSDe / USD(0xFF3BC18cCBd5999CE63E788A1c250a88626aD099) wrapped bySimpleOracle0xb6aD3633…fB4Dand read byPriceRouter. Used for the sUSDe collateral-pricing leg. (Ethereum.) - Chainlink Functions —
NAVConsumer0x84d4eaeb…2b4b6subscribes to the mainnet DONfun-ethereum-mainnet-1(subscription85). A JS job in the DON computes the daily NAV offchain and the result is written onchain viafulfillRequest→navReceiver.setSharePrice→SharePriceCalculator. (Ethereum.) - Chainlink Automation — a keeper calls
NAVConsumer.performUpkeep(bytes)daily (observed every ~86400 s; target time 23:45 UTC). This is what triggers (2). (Ethereum.) - Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve — "Re Offchain Reserves" (proxy
0xc79a363a3f849d8b3F6A1932f748eA9d4fB2f607→AccessControlledOCR2Aggregator 1.0.0[0x2c04457B…E7d7], Avalanche). Listed in Chainlink's reference directory (feeds-avalanche-mainnet.json) under pathre-reserves,productType: "Proof of Reserve", categorycustom.decimals() = 8;latestRoundData()returned ~$176.8M updated 2026-06-17 00:06 UTC; backed by 16 OCR2 transmitters. Data source: The Network Firm's LedgerLens™ On-Chain Proof of Reserves API. Chainlink's listing marks it "non-value-securing" and includes a disclaimer that neither TNF nor Chainlink attests to the accuracy of the balance data. (data.chain.link)
So Re's claim "A JSON price feed is pushed on-chain via Chainlink" is correct in a loose sense: the NAV is produced by Chainlink Functions and pushed by Chainlink Automation, even though it's not a classic Chainlink "price feed aggregator". The NAV Oracle code was audited by Hacken in Apr 2025 (repo github.com/resilience-foundation/nav-oracle).
The "Proof-of-Reserves, publicly auditable" claim — now substantiated on Avalanche, with caveats:
- The PoR feed exists and is live (corrected). "Re Offchain Reserves" is in Chainlink's reference directory on Avalanche (
feeds-avalanche-mainnet.json, pathre-reserves,productType: "Proof of Reserve") and resolves onchain to a workingAccessControlledOCR2Aggregatorupdated June 17, 2026. The earlier finding ("no feed matchingreusd/resilienceexists … nor on Avalanche") was wrong as of this reassessment — the canonical Ethereum-only directory (feeds-mainnet.json) does not list it, but the Avalanche directory does. - It is not consumed onchain by Re's Ethereum contracts.
InsuranceCapitalLayer,ShareToken,SharePriceCalculator,PriceRouter,SharePriceOracle, and the Redemption contracts make nolatestRoundDatacall against this (or any) reserves feed. The PoR feed is a standalone transparency publication on a different chain, not an input to reUSD pricing, minting, or redemption. So it improves auditability, not onchain enforcement. - Its data source is the same offchain attestor. The feed is fed by The Network Firm's LedgerLens™ API, so it transports TNF's offchain attestation onto Chainlink's signed OCR2 infrastructure — it is not an independent second verifier, and Chainlink explicitly disclaims attesting to the accuracy of the underlying balances ("non-value-securing").
- It reports "Re Offchain Reserves" generically (~$176.8M), not a reUSD-only figure, and covers offchain trust balances — distinct from the onchain reUSD reserves (~$97.37M) this report audits directly.
Bottom line:
- "JSON price feed pushed via Chainlink" → true (Functions + Automation, verified onchain, Ethereum).
- "Published via Chainlink oracle (for offchain bank balances)" → true — a Chainlink PoR feed for Re's offchain reserves is live on Avalanche (TNF LedgerLens source), correcting the earlier "not verified" finding.
- "Proof-of-reserves, publicly auditable" → substantially true, with caveats: there is now a Chainlink-signed reserves feed, but it (a) mirrors TNF's offchain attestation rather than independently verifying reserves, (b) is labeled non-value-securing with an accuracy disclaimer, and (c) is not consumed by reUSD's Ethereum logic. Reserve assurance therefore rests on (i) direct onchain balance audit of the ICL/vault/custodian addresses, (ii) The Network Firm's attestation, now also (iii) Chainlink-published on Avalanche.
Action: the Chainlink PoR feed is real and monitorable (latestRoundData() on 0xc79a363a…2f607, Avalanche). When Re cites "Chainlink proof-of-reserves," treat it as a transparency mirror of TNF's attestation on Avalanche — not as an independent onchain control that gates reUSD value on Ethereum. Verify the feed's heartbeat and value rather than assuming it enforces anything.